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Non-technical summary
Many banks in Germany are characterised by small capital ratios. On the one hand
these banks can fund themselves through deposits at low costs, but on the other hand
banking regulation forces them to maintain a certain minimum of capital. Although
the capital ratios of these banks do not differ considerably, there might be some re-
markable differences in their refinancing behaviour.
Banking regulation may have a stronger effect on undercapitalised or adequately
capitalised banks than on well-capitalised banks. The former banks probably increa-
se regulatory capital to a greater extent than the latter to avoid direct or indirect pu-
nishment by the regulator.
Traditional determinants found in the corporate finance literature may be relevant
for banks as well. The higher the profitability, the more capital can be retained to
increase capital. Furthermore, the larger the bank, the lower may be the capital ratio
as these banks can refinance in the capital market more easily. Finally, larger banks
may have more diversified portfolios and thus may need a lower capital buffer.
Based on bank-level data of nearly all German banks for the period 1992-2001, we
examine the determinants of bank capital for the three pillars of the German banking
market: savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks. We find the following
patterns of bank behaviour:
 Portfolio risk has a significant and positive effect on capital for savings banks as
these banks have less regulatory capital than other banks and are more likely to
increase capital when increasing portfolio risk.
 Regulatory pressure influences the behaviour of all banking groups. Lower capi-
talised banks increase capital to a stronger extent than other banks.
 The size effect is much larger for other banks than for savings banks. This result
is plausible, since even large savings banks have a very limited access to the ca-
pital market and cannot issue new equity.
 Profitability is a significant determinant of bank capital only in the case of sa-
vings banks, since these banks particularly rely on retained earnings.
Further analysis suggests that savings banks and cooperative banks are more reliant
on subordinated debt to increase capital than other banks as their profitability is of-
ten insufficient to reach their target capital ratio.
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11 Introduction
There is a large number of empirical papers on the determinants of corporate capital.
Most of them do not consider banks, as they have a very different business. As a
consequence, little is known about how banks determine their capital ratio. As we
shall see, some papers examine the bank capital ratio, but usually they focus on the
efficiency of banking regulation and analyse a very special determinant of bank ca-
pital, the portfolio risk.
Indeed, portfolio risk may be of great importance to bank capital. In July 1988 the
Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices published its
risk-based capital standard (Basle Accord), which took effect in the end of 1992.
Since then, banks are obliged to hold a minimum regulatory capital ratio of 8 percent
of all risk-weighted on-balance-sheet assets. The individual balance sheet assets are
weighted according to four broad risk classes of 0, 20, 50 and 100 percent to obtain
a measure of portfolio risk.
As a consequence, one could expect that portfolio risk and capital are positively re-
lated - at least for the banks that hold about as little regulatory capital as permissab-
le, because they have to increase capital when increasing portfolio risk. Berger et al.
(1995) show the potential impact of the Basle Accord on bank capital. The aggregate
equity-to-asset-ratio for US-banks rose from 6.21 percent at the end of 1989 to 8.01
percent at the end of 1993. They suggest that much of the increase has to be attribu-
ted to banking regulation.1 According to Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) US-banks
also shifted their portfolio in favour of less risky government securities after bank
regulators agreed to the introduction of risk-based capital requirements in 1988.2
Aggarwal and Jacques (1997) finally state that most US-banks succeeded to fulfill
the regulatory minimum: Less than one percent of all banks were categorised as un-
dercapitalised in the end of 1992.
In this study we investigate whether the current Basle Accord affects the behaviour
of German banks. Similar to the US, most German banks hold considerably more
capital than necessary (see, for instance, Deutsche Bundesbank (2002b)). Thus they
are not forced to keep that strict positive relationship between portfolio risk and ca-
pital. In this respect it remains unclear whether regulation results in a positive relati-
onship between bank capital and portfolio risk for German banks. Results from US
studies may not be applicable to German banks, as the latter’s behaviour may differ
considerably. Unlike the US, only a small fraction of German banks are joint-stock
                                          
1 Ashcraft (2001) argues that this effect was rather due to market forces than to banking regulation.
2 However, Hancock and Wilcox (1994) cannot detect a strong effect on bank lending to busi-
nesses.
2companies. That is why the argument that banks maximise their shareholder value is
less convincing for German banks.
The German banking structure is characterised by its three banking groups of sa-
vings banks, cooperative banks and other banks. We enrich the literature by diffe-
rentiating between these three banking groups in detail. Indeed, we find considerable
differences between the behaviour of these banking groups. Results suggest that sa-
vings banks rely much stronger on retained earnings than other banks, as they have
less alternatives to raise capital. Furthermore, we find a positive relationship bet-
ween portfolio risk and capital for these banks. In case of other banks, no significant
impact of profitability or portfolio risk on capital is found. However, we find a ne-
gative and significant effect of bank size on bank capital only for other banks. This
finding is due to institutional characteristics. Additionally, results suggest a signifi-
cant and positive impact of regulatory pressure on bank capital for other banks, but
not for savings banks.
Furthermore, some additional determinants of bank capital are considered in this
study, which were given little attention in previous literature. We examine whether
the bank deposit ratio and the loan loss provisions have a significant impact on the
bank capital ratio.
Finally, we apply a more appropriate econometric methodology. We estimated dy-
namic panel regressions using the generalised method of moments (GMM). By
using GMM the endogeneity of all explanatory variables can be considered effi-
ciently. In contrast, previous literature mostly uses simple two- or three-stage least
squares regressions on the pooled data set or, when considering the panel-structure
of the data set, simple random effects regressions.
The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2 presents some hypotheses to be
examined. Furthermore, it gives an overview about potential determinants of bank
capital. Section 3 summarises recent empirical work on the determinants of bank
capital and Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 introduces the empirical methodo-
logy and the final specification of the model. Section 6 presents the results regarding
the determinants of bank capital. In Section 7 the subordinated debt issue is ex-
amined in detail and Section 8 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
Risk-based capital requirements were proposed by the Basle Accord in 1988 for the
first time. The reasoning behind the regulatory linking of capital with portfolio risk
was the fear that banks could otherwise have an incentive to increase portfolio risk
and thus to increase the probability of default, which would run counter to the regu-
3lator’s intention of limiting the probability of default. Indeed, theories suggest that
banks’ choices of portfolio risk and capital are interrelated.
Hypothesis 1A (H1A): Bank capital and portfolio risk are negatively related because of de-
posit insurance.
A flat-rate deposit insurance can induce a bank to maximise its shareholder value by
maximising both portfolio risk and leverage. Hence, this argument is valid for joint-
stock companies, but hardly applies to German savings and cooperative banks in
other legal forms. Merton (1977) and Pyle (1986) model the claim on the deposit
insurer as a put option on the firm‘s value with the promised payment to the depo-
sitors being the strike price. Sharpe (1978), Kareken and Wallace (1978) and Dothan
and Williams (1980) argue within a state-preference model and show that subsidised
deposit insurance results in an incentive for value-maximising banks to increase
both portfolio risk and leverage risk.3 In this regard, deposit insurance could result in
a negative relationship between capital and portfolio risk.
Hypothesis 1B (H1B): Bank capital and portfolio risk are positively related because of other
factors.
Bankruptcy costs
Orgler and Taggart (1983) apply a modified version of the traditional trade-off theo-
ry to banks. They claim that besides taxes and bankruptcy costs, the special tax
treatment of bank services and economies of scale in the production of these services
have to be considered. As bankruptcy costs are dependent on both portfolio risk and
leverage risk, banks will increase capital when they increase risk to avoid ban-
kruptcy. In this case, banks have an own incentive to limit the probability of default.
                                          
3 Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) argue that under flat-rate deposit in-
surance and within both option and state-preference models, the incentive to increase portfolio
risk and leverage decreases with the capital ratio. Thus, a more stringent capital regulation redu-
ces the incentive to increase portfolio risk.
4Financial risk and portfolio risk as substitutes
Very close to the argument above is the following. Within a mean-variance-
framework it is also possible that risk averse bank managers wish to hold a certain
optimal level of total risk as a sum of portfolio and leverage risk (see Kahane
(1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet
(1992)). In this case portfolio and leverage risk would be substitutes and capital and
portfolio risk would be positively linked. A plausible rationale for this interrelati-
onship of portfolio risk and leverage risk can be provided by agency theory. Bank
managers, if they are not the owners of the bank, are especially afraid of a potential
bankruptcy, because they would lose their job and their firm-specific human capital.
That is why they should tend to decrease leverage when increasing risk (see Saun-
ders et al. (1990)).
Regulatory costs
Up to now, banking regulation was neglected. A positive association between capital
and risk could result from the costs of violating banking regulation. Buser et al.
(1981) argue that banks have to balance the advantage of high portfolio risk against
the explicit and implicit costs of regulation. Implicit costs of regulation may arise
because of regulatory interference, which reduces the charter value of the bank.4 As
a result, banks hold capital levels slightly above the regulatory minimum. A positive
relationship between risk and capital therefore could indicate that regulatory con-
straints are binding.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The higher the banks’ profitability, the higher is the bank capital ratio.
The banks‘ profitability determines the banks‘ ability to increase capital by accu-
mulating profits. That is why a positive relationship between the banks’ profitability
and capital is to be presumed. Such a relationship would be consistent with the pek-
king-order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984). They claim that enterprises prefer
funding by accumulating profits. Other possibilities to raise money by selling bonds
or new shares are more expensive means of refinancing because of information
asymmetries. Although information asymmetries may be lower in the case of banks,
the pecking-order theory may hold even for banks.
It is expected that profitability is an especially important determinant for savings
banks, as they cannot issue new shares on the capital market, but substantially rely
                                          
4 The charter value of a bank is the present value of the bank’s prospective new investments. See,
for example,  Acharya (1996) for the importance of the charter value for a bank.
5on retained earnings to increase capital. As argued by Dahl and Shrieves (1989), the
magnitude of equity infusions make them an important instrument to increase the
bank capital ratio.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The bigger the bank, the lower is the bank capital ratio.
Larger banks could have an easier access to the capital market and could raise exter-
nal capital more easily due to lower transaction costs. Thus they may have a greater
financial flexibility and may need less excess regulatory capital than smaller banks.
Moreover larger banks may have less investment opportunities and thus need less
capital. In addition, they are more likely to have a more diversified portfolio and
thus need less excess capital from the bank manager’s point of view. According to
Titman and Wessels (1988), fixed direct bankruptcy costs finally constitute a smaller
portion of firm value when the firm is larger, lowering the importance of the ban-
kruptcy costs. All these reasons may result in a negative relationship between size
and bank capital.
This size effect is supposed to be smaller for savings and cooperative banks. As they
usually are not listed on the stock exchange, they cannot issue new shares or cannot
sell investments on the capital market to reduce liabilities, but must rely on retained
earnings or issue of subordinate debt or hybrid capital. Furthermore, their business is
limited to a certain local area, accordingly their portfolio may be less diversified.
Finally bankruptcy costs are irrelevant for savings banks because of specific go-
vernmental guarantees (Gewährträgerhaftung and Anstaltslast) granted until July
2005.
3 Previous empirical findings
A number of empirical studies have examined the relationship between changes in
the bank capital ratio and portfolio risk (see Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (1999) for an overview). They differ in the methodology used and in the time
period and country observed. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) find a positive relationship
between the capital ratio and portfolio risk for US banks during the period 1984 to
1986 using a simultaneous equations framework. Furthermore, they show that regu-
latory pressure induces banks to increase the capital ratio and to decrease portfolio
risk. Rime (2001) applies the same methodology to Swiss Banks and confirms the
positive relationship between the capital ratio and portfolio risk, but could not find
that regulatory pressure can affect the level of portfolio risk. Likewise Bichsel and
Blum (2002) find a positive relationship between the bank capital ratio and portfolio
risk for Swiss banks from 1990 to 2002 in a similar two equation framework. Ediz et
al. (1998) detect a positive relationship between the capital ratio and portfolio risk
6for British banks from 1989 to 1995, but cannot confirm that these banks increase
their capital ratio by decreasing risk. They consider the panel structure of the data set
by estimating random effects regressions, but ignore the endogeneity of portfolio
risk. Nachane et al. (2000) adopt the model of Ediz et al. (1998) and apply it for In-
dia. Their results confirm the result that capital requirements make banks boost their
capital ratio. No evidence was found that banks adjust their regulatory capital ratios
by substituting from high-risk loans.
Jacques and Nigro (1997) use the simultaneous equations framework of Shrieves
and Dahl and show that the introduction of risk-based capital ratios caused US banks
to increase their capital ratios and to decrease portfolio risk in 1990 and 1991. Ag-
garwal and Jacques (2001) examine the behaviour of US banks in different prompt
corrective action (PCA) zones established by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act (FDICIA) within the simultaneous-equation-framework.
They find that both undercapitalised and adequately capitalised banks increased their
capital ratios in 1992 and 1993.
All these findings from the literature would be consistent with our hypothesis H1B,
claiming a positive relationship between capital and portfolio risk.
Nearly all of these studies, as they consider the banks’ profitability as a potential
determinant of the bank capital ratio, come to the conclusion that the capital ratio is
positively influenced by profitability, but negatively influenced by bank size. These
findings for US banks are consistent with our hypotheses H2 and H3 mentioned
above.
4 Data
In contrast to the literature, we examine banks in Germany. Two data sets are analy-
sed for that purpose. The first one is a unique data set provided by the Deutsche
Bundesbank. The Bundesbank data set comprises yearly balance sheet and profit and
loss account information of almost all German banks (no building and loan associa-
tions) reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1992 to 2001.5 The first two years,
1992 and 1993, are lost due to considering dynamics and first differencing. To run
the dynamic panel regressions, continuous observations of each bank are needed.
Therefore, we excluded these banks from the data set with six and less consecutive
observations. A sample of 2,971 banks and 28,025 observations remains.
                                          
5 We use the end-of-December data of the monthly Bilanzstatistik (BISTA), as the profit and loss
accounts are reported yearly. Some cooperative banks and other banks could not be taken into
account because of data restrictions.
7As the German banking sector is very heterogeneous, we divide the whole sample
into three subsamples. The first subsample comprises all German savings banks.
These are statutory bodies which are publicly owned, whose activities are locally
bounded and whose main object is to fulfill the public contract. The second sub-
sample consists of nearly all German cooperative banks. Similar to the savings
banks, their business is limited to a certain local area, but they are not subject to the
public contract like savings banks. The third group is denoted other banks. On the
one hand, these other banks consist of commercial banks, i.e. big banks, branches of
foreign banks and (private) regional banks and other commercial banks. On the other
hand the group of other banks comprises Land banks (Landesbanken), regional in-
stitutions of credit cooperatives, mortgage banks and banks with special functions
(Banken mit Sonderaufgaben). A more detailed analysis is not possible, as the data
set allows no further identification of each bank. Table 1a gives a synopsis of the
banking groups in 2001.
Table 1a: Synopsis of the banking groups in 2001 (Deutsche Bundesbank 2002a)
            Number of banks
- Savings banks    537
- Cooperative banks 1,619
- Other banks    363
- Commercial banks 279
- Big banks     4
- Regional banks and other commercial banks 195
- Branches of foreign banks   80
- Land banks (Landesbanken)   12
- Regional institutions of cooperative banks     1
- Mortgage banks   28
- Banks with special functions   14
- Building and loan associations   29
2,519
The second data set we use is provided by the publishing house Hoppenstedt (see
www.Hoppenstedt.de). The data set comprises published balance sheet and profit
and loss account information of about 1,000 German banks. Smaller banks, particu-
larly smaller cooperative banks, are missing in the Hoppenstedt data set. We exami-
ne bank behaviour for the reference period 1992-2001 and define the variables very
similar to those from the Bundesbank data set.
As most German banks are not publicly listed and market values are not available
for them, we examine book values instead of market values.
84.1 Bank capital
Two different definitions of capital are presented in this study to obtain a differen-
tiated impression of how banks determine their capital ratios. The first one is a
simple capital ratio defined as the ratio of equity capital to total assets (CAP1).6 The
second definition of capital refers to regulatory capital. CAP2 is a proxy variable for
Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital to total assets. It is defined as the ratio of paid-up equity ca-
pital including the fund for general bank risks, profit-sharing capital and subordinate
debt, which in total are divided by total assets.7 As we do not have any information
about hidden reserves or revaluation reserves, CAP2 is a little smaller than the actual
sum of Tier 1 + Tier 2 to total assets. Additionally, we estimated our model with a
third definition of capital. CAP3 is a proxy variable for the ratio of Tier 1 capital to
total assets. It comprises paid-up equity capital including the fund for general bank
risks. We do not present the results for CAP3 here as the definition of CAP3 is very
close to the definition of CAP1 and the results are very similar.
4.2 Bank risk
Banks’ portfolio risk (RISK) is measured by the ratio of risk-weighted on-balance-
sheet assets to total assets.8 We use the risk weights suggested by the Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Regulation in 1988, which are still obligatory until today. Within
the Basle Accord framework the individual assets of a bank are weighted according
to four broad risk classes of 0, 20, 50 and 100 percent. Recent literature has pointed
to the fact that such a measure of portfolio risk is too rough to indicate the banks’
probability of default. But here we are not interested in an accurate measure of the
probability of default, but wish to explain banking behaviour in the regulatory con-
text.
5 Partial-adjustment-framework and specification
We assume that banks consciously aim at a certain capital ratio (see Diamond et al.
(2000) for the existence of an optimal bank capital ratio). The existence of capital
regulation may give a strong hint that the capital ratio is at least partially influenced
                                          
6 Equity capital comprises subscribed capital, capital reserves, revenue reserves and stated loss in
case of the Bundesbank data set. In case of the Hoppenstedt data set, equity capital comprises
subscribed capital, capital reserves, revenue reserves and distributable profit.
7 In contrast to German banking law (Kreditwesengesetz), CAP2 and CAP3 comprise subscribed
capital even in the case of savings banks. See the appendix for an exact definition of the varia-
bles.
8 Other risk assets like off-balance-sheet engagements and derivatives as well as market risk could
not be considered, because we do not have any information about these items.
9by the bank. Thus we suggest that changes of the bank capital ratio result from dis-
cretionary adjustments and factors exogenous to the bank:
, , ,   
d
j t j t j tCAP CAP  . (1)
,j tCAP are the observed changes in the capital ratio for bank j in period t. The dis-
cretionary changes in the capital ratio are denoted ,dj tCAP . The error j,t denotes the
exogenous factors influencing the bank capital ratio. An unanticipated shock to the
national economy or an exogenously enforced increase of regulatory capital could be
random factors influencing the bank capital ratio.
The discretionary changes in the capital ratio ,dj tCAP  are modelled within a partial
adjustment framework. Modelling the bank capital decision within a partial adjust-
ment model is very common in the literature. Peltzman (1970), Mingo (1975) and
Marcus (1981) were the first to apply such a model to analyse the bank capital deci-
sion, then many other empirical studies using the model in a simultaneous equation
framework followed (see Section 3).
Banks are assumed to have a desired target capital ratio, but are not able to reach it
instantaneously.9 Within this framework, the discretionary changes in capital are
proportional to the difference between the target values and the lagged values of ca-
pital:
*
, , , 1 ,     j t j t j t j tCAP CAP CAP  . (2)
The coefficient   can be interpreted as the speed of adjustment. A high value of 
indicates that the bank reaches its target capital ratio very quickly. *,j tCAP  denotes the
target capital ratio for bank j in period t. Target capital is not directly observable and
may differ cross-sectionally.
                                          
9 As the optimal or desired capital ratio and portfolio risk are not observable, it is assumed that the
bank managers discretionary adjust the actual level of capital and risk towards the optimal level.
This assumption can be explained by institutional inertia, high costs of rapid change, or a lack of
information.
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After rewriting equation (2) as follows:
*
, , 1 , , 1 ,      j t j t j t j t j tCAP CAP CAP CAP  . (3)
we obtain our final regression equation:
*
, , 1 , ,(1 )    j t j t j t j tCAP CAP CAP   . (4)
We estimate the model with all three definitions of capital to total assets (CAP1,
CAP2, and CAP3) as left-hand-variables.10
5.1 Variables affecting target capital
As the target capital ratio *,j tCAP  is not directly observable, some proxy variables
have to be found. We use some observable bank characteristics to describe *,j tCAP . In
the following, the explanatory variables affecting the target capital ratio *,j tCAP  are
presented.
Portfolio risk
As shown in the theoretical literature, capital and portfolio risk are interrelated (see
hypotheses H1A and H1B). Regulation could have a decisive influence on the relati-
onship between both variables. That is why portfolio risk (RISK) is expected to be a
determinant of banks’ target capital.
                                          
10 We also used other definitions of capital. Estimation of capital to risk-weighted assets resulted
in a strong negative relationship between capital and risk. We assume that this strong negative
relationship is caused by the construction of the variables: The denominator of the dependent
variable capital to risk-weighted assets would be identical to the numerator of the regressor
RISK.
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Profitability
Corresponding to hypothesis H2, target capital may be influenced by banks’ profita-
bility. That is why PROFIT is included in the capital equation. PROFIT is defined as
the ratio of net interest income plus net commission income to total assets.
Bank deposit ratio
Bank deposits are a very attractive means to fund the bank, because of the relatively
lower interest rates to be paid compared to bonds or borrowing from banks. A de-
creasing bank deposit ratio makes banks’ debt more expensive and reduces the cur-
rent profit. This effect is controlled for by including PROFIT into the equation. But
a decreasing (increasing) deposit ratio may signal even lower (higher) net interest
profits in future years (see Gupta and Walker (1975)). Accordingly, lower (higher)
future profits could mean increased (lower) pressure to extend the capital buffer. As
a consequence, we expect a negative relationship between the capital ratio and the
bank deposit ratio (BDR). We include BDR into our capital equation as it may have a
significant influence on bank capital. The BDR is defined as the ratio of all liabilities
to customers to total assets.
As both bank deposits and equity capital are components of the liabilities side of the
bank balance sheet, it could be argued that a negative relationship between both va-
riables alternatively could be the result of a simple automatism. But the automatism
is not compelling. Most banks hold a considerable amount of liabilities to banks,
which buffer fluctuations in the amount of liabilities to customers. Finally, we rule
out the automatic effect of fluctations in the amount of deposits on total assets and
thus on the ratio of capital to total assets by controlling for size.
Provisions
We also consider provisions for possible loan losses as well as write-downs and
write-ups of and value adjustments to claims and securities. The ratio of these varia-
bles to total assets (PROV) may represent a proxy for the banks’ financial health. We
assume that banks with higher provisions have a lower capital target, as they are not
able to increase their capital ratio significantly because the provisions reduce current
profits. Thus we expect a negative impact of PROV on the capital ratio.
Regulatory pressure
As the theoretical literature suggests, banking regulation may have a direct effect on
capital. A bank having a regulatory capital ratio close to the regulatory minimum
may have an incentive to increase its regulatory capital ratio in order to prevent the
capital ratio from falling below the regulatory minimum. Otherwise regulatory costs
12
may arise. To capture this potential effect, we include a dummy variable REG into
the equation, indicating the banks’ regulatory pressure.11 The dummy variable equals
one if capital to risk-weighted-assets is lower than a certain threshold. These thres-
holds are calculated to include the quarter of banks with the lowest ratio of capital to
risk-weighted assets. The threshold is 6.0 percent for the CAP1-equation and thus is
two percentage points higher than the regulatory minimum of 4.0 percent for the
Tier 1 capital ratio.12 Simultaneously, this threshold coincides with the minimum
Tier 1 capital ratio necessary to be classified as well-capitalised according to the Fe-
deral Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). For the CAP2-
equation, the threshold of 7.0 percent lies below the regulatory minimum of 8.0 per-
cent for Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets, as CAP2 does not contain all
components of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.13
Merger
The German banking sector is characterised by many mergers and acquisitions in
recent years, which could have a direct impact on the banks’ capital ratio. We con-
trol for this effect by including the dummy variable MERG into the capital equation.
The dummy variable is one if a bank has taken over another bank in the same year
and zero otherwise.14
Size
Corresponding to hypothesis H3, size may have an influence on the target capital
ratio. To capture size effects, the natural log of total assets (SIZE) is included in the
capital equation.
Regulatory and macroeconomic shocks
Macroeconomic shocks must be taken into account, as changes in the volume or
structure of loan demand can influence banks’ observed capital. Also changes of the
banking regulation may influence the dependent variable in a specific year. That is
why time dummies are included in the capital equation.
                                          
11 We assume that REG indicates regulatory pressure, although we cannot exclude that it partly
measures the banks’ own incentive to prevent bancruptcy costs.
12 We also experimented with other thresholds, but obtained very similar results.
13 We do not have any information about the undisclosed reserves or revaluation reserves, which
are components of Tier 2 capital.
14 The dummy variable MERG was kindly provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Table 1b: Number of observations and mean of variables by year (Bundesbank data set)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 total
Obs. 2,733 2,963 2,966 2,971 2,971 2,971 2,971 2,728 2,480 2,271 28,025
sav. banks 500 590 590 590 590 590 590 578 561 535 5,714
coop. banks 1,954 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 1,899 1,675 1,512 19,574
other banks 279 284 287 292 292 292 292 251 244 224 2,737
CAP1 0.0491 0.0470 0.0488 0.0503 0.0508 0.0518 0.0532 0.0515 0.0538 0.0537 0.0509
CAP2 0.0502 0.0514 0.0549 0.0579 0.0595 0.0611 0.0625 0.0610 0.0637 0.0635 0.0584
CAP3 0.0491 0.0470 0.0489 0.0503 0.0509 0.0518 0.0532 0.0516 0.0540 0.0538 0.0509
CRWA1 0.1010 0.0995 0.1058 0.1071 0.1152 0.1120 0.1277 0.1118 0.1263 0.1245 0.1127
CRWA2 0.1027 0.1067 0.1165 0.1198 0.1295 0.1273 0.1429 0.1276 0.1422 0.1401 0.1251
CRWA3 0.1009 0.0995 0.1066 0.1072 0.1153 0.1121 0.1277 0.1120 0.1266 0.1247 0.1129
REG1 0.4274 0.3584 0.3240 0.2854 0.2545 0.2322 0.2383 0.2295 0.2101 0.2070 0.2787
REG2 0.6718 0.4222 0.3095 0.2158 0.1599 0.1434 0.1589 0.1393 0.1310 0.1233 0.2499
REG3 0.4274 0.3567 0.3233 0.2848 0.2535 0.2302 0.2370 0.2258 0.2060 0.1995 0.2766
RISK 0.6326 0.6055 0.6137 0.6152 0.6185 0.6258 0.6347 0.6330 0.6503 0.6456 0.6265
PROFIT 0.0370 0.0367 0.0379 0.0364 0.0356 0.0347 0.0332 0.0334 0.0345 0.0324 0.0353
BDR 0.7625 0.7533 0.7344 0.7207 0.7134 0.7045 0.6982 0.6870 0.6695 0.6813 0.7138
PROV 0.0004 0.0029 0.0058 0.0033 0.0033 0.0038 0.0032 0.0033 0.0047 0.0046 0.0035
SIZE 18.6817 18.8198 18.9099 18.9885 19.0622 19.1184 19.1800 19.3174 19.4548 19.5917 19.0965
SDEBT 0.0000 0.0028 0.0040 0.0053 0.0061 0.0066 0.0066 0.0068 0.0071 0.0072 0.0052
PCAP 0.0011 0.0016 0.0021 0.0023 0.0025 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0024 0.0023
MERG 0.0000 0.0391 0.0435 0.0263 0.0266 0.0263 0.0417 0.0601 0.0742 0.0638 0.0391
Table 1c: Mean of variables by banking groups (Bundesbank data set)
all banks sav. banks coop. banks other banks
CAP1 0.0509 0.0384 0.0469 0.1057
CAP2 0.0584 0.0526 0.0520 0.1161
CAP3 0.0509 0.0385 0.0469 0.1056
REG1 0.2787 0.4499 0.2367 0.2210
REG2 0.2499 0.1986 0.2844 0.1103
REG3 0.2766 0.4478 0.2353 0.2141
RISK 0.6265 0.6075 0.6443 0.5393
PROFIT 0.3527 0.0323 0.0360 0.0363
BDR 0.7138 0.6795 0.7740 0.3544
PROV 0.0035 0.0041 0.0034 0.0029
SIZE 19.0965 20.5613 18.4739 20.4912
SDEBT 0.0052 0.0128 0.0028 0.0066
PCAP 0.0023 0.0013 0.0023 0.0039
MERG 0.0391 0.0257 0.0464 0.0150
Table 1b presents the means of these variables of the Bundesbank data set for each
year of the reference period. On average, capital increases considerably in this time
period, while portfolio risk increases marginally. Table 1c shows some descriptive
statistics of the Bundesbank data set differentiating between the three banking
groups. On average, other banks have a higher capital ratio than savings and coope-
rative banks. Another noteworthy fact is the high share of subordinate debt to total
assets for savings banks. It seems that these banks compensate their lower equity
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capital ratio by issuing subordinate debt. We analyse this potential relationship in
Section 7. Table 1d gives the correlations among the variables for the reference pe-
riod. As in the study by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) for US-banks we find a negative
correlation between portfolio risk and capital.
Table 1d: Correlations among the variables (Bundesbank data set)
CAP1 CAP2 CAP3 RISK PROFIT BDR PROV
CAP2 0.9770
CAP3 0.9983 0.9787
RISK -0.0736 -0.0534 -0.0742
PROFIT 0.3739 0.3532 0.3752 0.1394
BDR -0.3364 -0.3918 -0.3369 0.1238 0.0921
PROV -0.0287 -0.0047 -0.0292 0.1576 0.0628 -0.0114
SIZE -0.2093 -0.1330 -0.2081 -0.1284 -0.3020 -0.4503 0.0668
Some descriptive statistics of the Hoppenstedt data set are given in Tables 1e and 1f.
Table 1e: Number of observations and mean of variables by year (Hoppenstedt data set)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 total
Obs. 925 997 1,012 1,024 1,023 1,030 1,021 1,023 965 876 9,896
sav. banks 385 433 448 455 456 451 446 441 419 368 4,302
coop. banks 261 290 293 293 295 308 316 320 295 284 2,955
other banks 279 274 271 276 272 271 259 262 251 224 2,639
CAP1 0.0501 0.0579 0.0589 0.0586 0.0588 0.0610 0.0609 0.0623 0.0610 0.0586 0.0589
CAP2 0.0664 0.0677 0.0702 0.0729 0.0743 0.0777 0.0776 0.0794 0.0783 0.0750 0.0740
CAP3 0.0646 0.0602 0.0603 0.0605 0.0606 0.0631 0.0628 0.0648 0.0638 0.0608 0.0621
CRWA1 0.1462 0.1407 0.1623 0.1488 0.1731 0.1638 0.1932 0.1648 0.1800 0.1649 0.1639
CRWA2 0.1811 0.1601 0.1796 0.1705 0.1962 0.1880 0.2169 0.1917 0.2065 0.1890 0.1880
CRWA3 0.1784 0.1491 0.1649 0.1520 0.1760 0.1672 0.1964 0.1705 0.1865 0.1696 0.1710
REG1 0.6281 0.4995 0.4852 0.4824 0.4966 0.4942 0.5260 0.4976 0.4694 0.4600 0.5035
REG2 0.6389 0.4162 0.3429 0.2822 0.2737 0.2650 0.2831 0.2483 0.2497 0.2432 0.3226
REG3 0.4757 0.4985 0.4842 0.4805 0.4946 0.4990 0.5299 0.4976 0.4694 0.4509 0.4888
RISK 0.6612 0.6708 0.6761 0.6815 0.6899 0.7019 0.7078 0.7096 0.7258 0.7256 0.6948
PROFIT 0.0355 0.0355 0.0341 0.0326 0.0328 0.0321 0.0324 0.0325 0.0883 0.0321 0.0386
BDR 0.6290 0.6457 0.6324 0.6198 0.6196 0.6147 0.6157 0.5996 0.5855 0.6046 0.6168
PROV 0.0014 0.0038 0.0066 0.0044 0.0042 0.0042 0.0033 0.0247 0.0245 0.0048 0.0059
SIZE 20.3869 20.4535 20.5433 20.6057 20.6829 20.7219 20.7717 20.8391 20.9300 21.0600 20.6967
SDEBT 0.0000 0.0052 0.0072 0.0094 0.0106 0.0112 0.0114 0.0115 0.0114 0.0112 0.0090
PCAP 0.0017 0.0022 0.0027 0.0030 0.0031 0.0033 0.0033 0.0031 0.0031 0.0029 0.0028
MERG 0.0022 0.0000 0.0119 0.0088 0.0137 0.0087 0.0264 0.0078 0.0093 0.0114 0.0101
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Table 1f: Mean of variables by banking groups (Hoppenstedt data set)
all banks sav. banks coop. banks other banks
CAP1 0.0589 0.0412 0.0463 0.1018
CAP2 0.0740 0.0555 0.0561 0.1241
CAP3 0.0621 0.0408 0.0474 0.1133
REG1 0.5035 0.6813 0.3922 0.3384
REG2 0.3226 0.4014 0.3117 0.2061
REG3 0.4888 0.6953 0.3658 0.2899
RISK 0.6948 0.7235 0.7092 0.6319
PROFIT 0.0386 0.0320 0.0324 0.0564
BDR 0.6168 0.6872 0.7450 0.3586
PROV 0.0059 0.0044 0.0040 0.0106
SIZE 20.6967 20.9571 20.2359 20.7882
SDEBT 0.0090 0.0133 0.0045 0.0069
PCAP 0.0028 0.0014 0.0041 0.0038
MERG 0.0101 0.0081 0.0183 0.0042
For the final specification of our model, we decided to insert both the current and
lagged values of the explanatory variables into the capital equation as specification
tests (Sargan tests) recommend a more general specification. The final specification
of the equation explaining the unobservable capital target is as follows:
*
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For bank size, only the current value is used in the regression. The effect of lagged
size on the capital ratio is of minor importance here. Furthermore, including lagged
size in the equation would result in a multicollinearity problem, as current size is
very strongly correlated with lagged size, while the correlation is smaller in case of
the other explanatory variables. In contrast, we only include the lagged value of the
dummy variable REG into our equation. Regulatory pressure in the previous year
can lead the bank to increase the capital ratio in the next year. However, including
the current dummy variable instead of the lagged dummy variable in the equation
would lead to a potential problem of simultaneity: a bank getting under regulatory
pressure in period t is unlikely to have increased its capital ratio above average in
period t.
(5)
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The model to be estimated is given by equations (4-5). The coefficients of the re-
gressors depict the dynamic short-term relationship between the bank capital ratio
and its determinants. To examine the long-run relationship, the speed of adjustment
  has to be taken into account. The long-run coefficients of the determinants can be
obtained as follows:
* * *1 1 2 2
, , ,
* *3 3 4 4
, ,
* * *5 5 6
, 1 , ,
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
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(6)
The coefficients of the explanatory variables marked with (*) denote the long-term
relationship between the determinants and the target capital ratio *j,tCAP . The coeffi-
cients ( t t,   and  ) are those calculated by using the dynamic estimation of equati-
on (4) together with equation (5).
5.2 Considering the panel structure
In contrast to previous empirical studies by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and
Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) and Rime (2001), we consider the panel
structure of the data set explicitly when estimating the model. Otherwise regarding
the observations of an individual bank as independent from each other may result in
biased coefficients. Indeed, the Breusch-Pagan test of poolability of the panel data
indicates the inappropriateness of pooling the panel data. The Hausman test rejects
the random effects assumption. That means that using fixed effects provides consi-
stent estimators, while using random effects does not. We thus take account of the
panel structure by adding fixed bank specific effects to equation (4). We assume that
the j,t follow a one-way error component model:
, , j t j j t   . (7)
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The j,t  denote the fixed bank specific effects, the j,t  the residual error, where
2
j,t IID(0, )  . Considering the panel structure of the data set within the fixed effects
model results in some econometric problems. As there is a lagged dependent varia-
ble ( , 1j tCAP ) on the right side of the equation (4), , 1j tCAP  is correlated with the indi-
vidual specific effects by construction. Accordingly, the estimation results are biased
(see Nickell (1981)). A possible solution suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) is
to remove the individual specific effects by first differencing the equation. But the
problem of correlation remains persistent. Now the differenced lagged dependent
variable , 1 j tCAP  is correlated with the differenced error term. Instrumental-variable
techniques can solve this problem. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest to use
, 2j tCAP  as an instrument for , 1 j tCAP . While , 2j tCAP  is correlated with , 1 j tCAP  by
construction, it is not correlated with the differenced error, as long as the error term
is not serially correlated. The estimator is consistent now, but not efficient, as not all
available moment restrictions are used. Arellano und Bond (1991) suggest to use
further lagged variables as instruments within a GMM-model. GMM enables to op-
timally exploit the orthogonality conditions between the lagged dependent variable
and the disturbances.
An important advantage of GMM is the fact that it allows to consider explicitly the
endogeneity not only of the lagged dependent variable but also of other right-hand
variables. Thus the endogeneity of portfolio risk as a possibly important determinant
of capital can be taken into account. As mentioned, theory suggests that portfolio
risk and capital are interrelated, i.e. portfolio risk is endogenous in the capital equa-
tion. Additionally, Berger (1995) assumes that profitability is affected by capital.
Thus PROFIT has to be endogenous as well in our capital equation. As we employ
balance sheet and profit and loss account information, the endogeneity of further
variables may be suspected. We performed Durbin-Wu-Hausman-tests to decide
whether variables have to be taken as exogenous or endogenous. Additionally, the
Sargan test gives some evidence whether the variables are better modelled as exoge-
nous, predetermined or endogenous. These tests suggest to regard not only portfolio
risk as endogenous, but all other explanatory variables as well.15
Potential pitfalls using GMM are the following. Firstly, the error term must not be
serially correlated of order one. After first differencing, the error term must not be
serially correlated of order two. Absence of second order correlation of the residuals
in first differences is of crucial importance for the consistency of the GMM esti-
mators. It is a necessary condition to use the regressors in levels lagged two periods
(e.g. , 2j tCAP ) as instruments for the regressors in differences (e.g. , 1 j tCAP ). Pre-
                                          
15 We had to regard MERGt as exogenous, as we could not find suitable instruments for this dum-
my variable.
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sence of second-order correlation would imply that these instruments are invalid, as
they are correlated with the error term. The test statistic for the first and second or-
der autocorrelation of residuals is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation. Secondly, suitable instruments for the whole set
of endogenous or predetermined explanatory variables have to be found. Therefore,
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions has to be tested. The Sargan test of
over-identifying restrictions tests the validity of the set of instruments. It is used to
check whether the whole set of instruments is correlated with the residuals. The test
statistic of the Sargan test is asymptotically distributed as 2 (df) under the null hy-
pothesis of instruments’ validity. If the over-identifying restrictions, that is the or-
thogonality conditions between the instruments and the residuals, are valid, the vali-
dity of the instrument set is confirmed. Violation of the Sargan test would shed
doubt on the specification of the model.
Arellano and Bover (1995) argue that the GMM model in first differences described
above (GMM-DIF) may suffer from weak instruments. As a consequence, poor
estimation precision may result. They propose to use instruments in first differences
for equations in levels in addition to using instruments in levels for equations in first
differences. Blundell and Bond (1998) recommend using this extended linear GMM
(GMM-SYS) when the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is close to one.
We estimated both GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS, but decided to stick with GMM-DIF
as the Sargan test shed more doubt on the validity of the over-identifying restrictions
in case of the extended set of instruments of GMM-SYS.
All calculations were conducted with Stata/SE 8.0 for Windows and DPD in OxPack
for GiveWin 2.10. The test for second-order correlation nearly always confirms that
the second lags of the regressors are not correlated with the error term. Thus the lag-
ged dependent variable and other lagged explanatory variables can be instrumented
by their lagged values from lag two. We use the two-step version of the GMM esti-
mator to obtain the Sargan test statistics, as the one-step version of the Sargan test
overrejects the validity of the set of instruments in presence of heteroskedasticity
(see Arellano and Bond (1991)). As recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991), the
autocorrelation tests for the residuals and the coefficient estimates are based on the
one-step version.
6 Results
6.1 Preliminary evidence
Before estimating the dynamic model within the GMM-framework, we take a step
back and estimate equation (4) together with equation (5) with the help of a simple
fixed effects model to obtain a first impression of the determinants of the bank ca-
pital ratio. Here, all right-hand variables are treated as exogenous, none of them are
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instrumented. We ignore the Nickell-Bias and the potential endogeneity of right-
hand variables. As a consequence, we may get coefficients that are potentially bia-
sed.
Table 2a: Simple fixed effects regression results for CAP1
P-value P-value P-value P-value
CAP1t-1 0.3493 *** 0.000 0.7755 *** 0.000 0.8115 *** 0.000 0.2479 *** 0.000
RISKt -0.0083 *** 0.000 0.0176 *** 0.000 0.0112 *** 0.000 -0.0416 ** 0.015
RISKt-1 0.0237 ** 0.017 -0.0091 *** 0.000 -0.0147 *** 0.000 0.0194 0.270
PROFITt 0.6358 *** 0.000 0.1092 *** 0.000 0.2163 *** 0.000 0.5412 *** 0.000
PROFITt-1 -0.2384 *** 0.000 0.0135 0.275 0.0054 0.704 -0.1196 * 0.053
BDRt -0.1325 *** 0.000 0.0219 *** 0.000 -0.0083 *** 0.000 -0.2023 *** 0.000
BDRt-1 0.0334 *** 0.000 -0.0291 *** 0.000 -0.0189 *** 0.000 0.1362 *** 0.000
PROVt 0.1587 *** 0.000 -0.0171 ** 0.038 -0.0029 0.749 0.4847 *** 0.000
PROVt-1 0.1052 *** 0.000 -0.0857 *** 0.000 -0.0546 *** 0.000 0.1904 ** 0.013
REG1ct-1 -0.0050 *** 0.000 -0.0002 ** 0.024 0.0003 ** 0.039 0.0059 0.215
MERGt 0.0065 *** 0.000 -0.0008 *** 0.000 0.0009 *** 0.000 0.0145 *** 0.000
SIZEt -0.0192 *** 0.000 0.0010 *** 0.000 -0.0008 *** 0.000 -0.0541 * 0.097
cons 0.4477 *** 0.000 -0.0153 *** 0.002 0.0408 *** 0.000 1.2075 *** 0.000
Observations 25,054 5,124 17,485 2,445
Banks 2,971 590 2,089 292
R2 within 0.2838 0.7483 0.6978 0.3690
R2 between 0.6241 0.9395 0.9628 0.5706
R2 overall 0.553 0.9059 0.9031 0.5060
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Results for CAP1 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks cooperative banks other banks
Note: These are fixed effects regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP1 for several samples of banks. All regressions include time
dummies. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
The regression results presented in Table 2a and 2b are differentiated on the one
hand between several subsamples of banks, the savings banks, the cooperatives and
the other banks, and on the other hand between both definitions of capital. For all
definitions of the capital ratio, the results indicate that the speed of adjustment is
much larger for other banks than for savings banks and cooperative banks, as the
coefficient of , 1j tCAP  is much lower for other banks. The fact that other banks can
adjust capital to their target capital ratio more quickly can be explained by their ea-
sier access to the capital market. To reach their capital target quickly, they can issue
new shares on the financial market or sell investments to reduce liabilities.
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Table 2b: Simple fixed effects regression results for CAP2
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
CAP2t-1 0.3852 *** 0.000 0.6952 *** 0.000 0.7691 *** 0.000 0.2692 *** 0.000
RISKt 0.0019 0.585 0.0219 *** 0.000 0.0136 *** 0.000 -0.0188 0.273
RISKt-1 0.0215 *** 0.000 -0.0070 ** 0.026 -0.0163 *** 0.000 0.0066 0.709
PROFITt 0.6678 *** 0.000 0.1362 *** 0.000 0.1966 *** 0.000 0.5861 *** 0.000
PROFITt-1 -0.2879 *** 0.000 0.0761 ** 0.019 0.0184 0.261 -0.1525 ** 0.015
BDRt -0.1320 *** 0.000 0.0154 *** 0.000 -0.0218 *** 0.000 -0.1942 *** 0.000
BDRt-1 0.0357 *** 0.000 -0.0216 *** 0.000 -0.0097 *** 0.000 0.1356 *** 0.000
PROVt 0.1908 *** 0.000 -0.0266 0.213 0.0269 ** 0.010 0.5487 *** 0.000
PROVt-1 0.1190 *** 0.000 -0.1034 *** 0.000 -0.0515 *** 0.000 0.2128 *** 0.006
REG2ct-1 -0.0061 *** 0.000 0.0014 *** 0.000 0.0005 *** 0.000 -0.0072 0.122
MERGt 0.0062 *** 0.000 -0.0010 ** 0.020 0.0008 *** 0.000 0.0173 * 0.050
SIZEt -0.0202 *** 0.000 0.0007 0.272 -0.0023 *** 0.000 -0.0534 *** 0.000
cons 0.4647 *** 0.000 -0.0064 0.626 0.0737 *** 0.000 1.1922 *** 0.000
Observations 25,054 5,124 17,485 2,445
Banks 2,971 590 2,089 292
R2 within 0.3178 0.7295 0.6875 0.3768
R2 between 0.5898 0.9252 0.9318 0.5572
R2 overall 0.5212 0.8369 0.8672 0.4911
Results for CAP2 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks cooperatives other banks
Note: These are fixed effects regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP2 for several samples of banks. All regressions include time
dummies. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Furthermore, the results indicate that portfolio risk (for savings and cooperative
banks) and profitability positively influence the capital ratio. Thus we have first evi-
dence that both H1B and H2 are correct. For the other banks we do not obtain a si-
gnificant and positive relationship between portfolio risk and the capital ratio. As
other banks have a considerably higher capital ratio on average, they might not be
forced to raise capital when increasing portfolio risk.
Even the results for the bank deposit ratio (BDR) vary for the different banking
groups. We expected a negative relationship as banks should make a greater (smal-
ler) effort to raise capital when their bank deposit ratio decreases (increases). Indeed,
we find a negative and significant effect of BDR on the capital ratio for the coopera-
tive and other banks.
Provisions (PROV) have a negative impact on the bank capital ratio for the savings
and cooperative banks, but a positive one for the other banks. Probably this result is
due to the latters’ ability to issue new shares or to sell investments on the capital
market even in a state of bad financial health.
The results for the dummy variable REG show a positive effect of regulatory pressu-
re on the capital ratio for the cooperative banks, but mixed results for the savings
banks. Although these results may be simply due to the potential specification error,
they may indicate that savings banks have greater difficulties in increasing the capi-
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tal ratio in case of regulatory pressure. Savings banks rely on retained earnings and
issuing subordinate debt or hybrid capital to increase capital.
The merger dummy variable MERG is positive for cooperative banks and other
banks but negative for savings banks. That result implies that merger have a positive
effect on the capital ratio for cooperative banks and other banks. Increasing the ca-
pital ratio may have been a motivation behind the mergers for these banks. The ne-
gative effect for savings banks may be the consequence of financial distress preven-
tion among savings banks. Well capitalised savings banks may merge with badly
capitalised banks to relieve these banks from financial distress. As a recent example,
the savings bank of Weinheim merged with the savings bank of Mannheim in the
end of 2000, because the latter had been in financial distress.
Size has a negative impact on the capital ratio for cooperative banks and other
banks. However, we find a significant and positive coefficient for savings banks in
case of CAP2. Accordingly, our hypothesis H3 is confirmed for the cooperative
banks and other banks, but not for the savings banks. This result coincides with our
expectations. We assumed that the negative size effect may be smaller for savings
banks due to their specific institutional conditions.
6.2 GMM-Results
Tables 3a and 3b show the GMM-results for the dynamic short run model given by
equations (4) and (5). Now, we explicitly consider the potential endogeneity of the
explanatory variables. Again, it is differentiated on the one hand between savings
banks, cooperative and other banks, and on the other hand between both definitions
of capital.
We consciously interprete only the coefficients of the model for the savings banks
and the other banks, as the specification tests for these subsamples do not shed any
doubt on the specification of the model (exemption: CAP2-model for the savings
banks). In these cases the test for no autocorrelation in residuals of order two is al-
ways insignificant. This is a necessary condition to get consistent GMM estimators.
Furthermore, the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions is always insignificant
in these cases and signals the validity of the set of instruments.
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Table 3a: Dynamic GMM-DIF-regression for CAP1
P-value P-value P-value P-value
CAP1t-1 0.2165 *** 0.006 0.6596 *** 0.000 0.6600 *** 0.000 0.1333 * 0.096
RISKt -0.0192 0.793 0.0180 *** 0.000 0.0606 ** 0.032 -0.0045 0.961
RISKt-1 0.0609 0.332 -0.0054 0.222 -0.0352 ** 0.048 0.1020 0.111
PROFITt 0.1603 0.275 0.1147 ** 0.017 -1.2582 0.368 0.0582 0.692
PROFITt-1 0.0562 0.601 0.0482 0.136 1.2128 0.218 -0.0005 0.996
BDRt -0.2521 *** 0.002 0.0302 *** 0.000 -0.1265 * 0.095 -0.3132 *** 0.000
BDRt-1 0.2687 *** 0.000 -0.0312 *** 0.000 -0.0045 0.835 0.2101 *** 0.001
PROVt 1.0144 ** 0.021 -0.0192 0.572 -0.0362 0.294 1.0594 *** 0.005
PROVt-1 0.1428 0.110 -0.0507 *** 0.001 0.0274 0.563 0.2443 * 0.078
REG1ct-1 0.0010 * 0.096 0.0001 0.173 -0.0001 0.836 0.0061 ** 0.034
MERGt 0.0357 *** 0.000 -0.0004 0.719 0.0150 * 0.065 0.0247 * 0.078
SIZEt -0.0930 *** 0.000 0.0004 0.833 -0.0387 * 0.080 -0.1114 *** 0.000
cons 0.0035 0.197 0.0005 ** 0.020 0.0017 0.286 0.0040 0.177
Observations 22,083 4,534 15,396 2,153
Banks 2,971 590 2,089 292
Sargan (df) 476(241) 0.00 256(241) 0.25 387(241) 0.00 261(241) 0.18
AR(1) -4.33 0.00 -7.32 0.00 -1.54 0.12 -3.53 0.00
AR(2) -0.89 0.37 -1.10 0.27 1.02 0.31 -1.11 0.27
Results for CAP1 (to total assets)
savings banksall banks cooperative banks other banks
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Note: These are GMM regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP1 for several samples of banks. Estimates are obtained using the
Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include time dummies. Instruments begin with the third lag. P-values are calculated on the basis
of standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond, one-step results are
presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second order autocorrelation
in the residuals. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 3b: Dynamic GMM-DIF-regression for CAP2
P-value P-value P-value P-value
CAP2t-1 0.2078 *** 0.008 0.6231 *** 0.000 0.6427 *** 0.000 0.1221 * 0.087
RISKt -0.0032 0.964 0.0485 *** 0.000 0.0656 ** 0.018 -0.0172 0.846
RISKt-1 0.0550 0.374 -0.0180 0.124 -0.0324 * 0.084 0.0840 0.201
PROFITt 0.2085 0.170 0.5850 *** 0.000 -1.2697 0.374 0.1064 0.472
PROFITt-1 0.1116 0.360 -0.0382 0.639 1.1785 0.240 0.0247 0.825
BDRt -0.2312 *** 0.006 0.0110 0.392 -0.1427 ** 0.046 -0.2829 *** 0.001
BDRt-1 0.2627 *** 0.000 -0.0121 0.315 -0.0022 0.926 0.2103 *** 0.001
PROVt 0.8762 ** 0.048 -0.0901 0.273 0.0485 0.210 1.0477 *** 0.007
PROVt-1 0.1919 ** 0.033 0.0062 0.868 0.0383 0.664 0.2843 ** 0.048
REG2ct-1 0.0010 0.356 0.0011 *** 0.000 0.0005 * 0.079 0.0132 * 0.070
MERGt 0.0362 *** 0.000 0.0009 0.709 0.0141 * 0.059 0.0305 * 0.058
SIZEt -0.0941 *** 0.000 0.0024 0.623 -0.0381 * 0.061 -0.1109 *** 0.000
cons 0.0045 0.111 -0.0038 *** 0.000 0.0008 0.604 0.0046 0.144
Observations 22,083 4,534 15,396 2,153
Banks 2,971 590 2,089 292
Sargan (df) 479(241) 0.00 345(241) 0.00 411(241) 0.00 250(241) 0.34
AR(1) -4.07 0.00 -7.84 0.00 -1.72 0.09 -3.49 0.00
AR(2) -0.74 0.46 -1.00 0.32 0.44 0.66 -0.94 0.35
Results for CAP2 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks cooperative banks other banks
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Note: These are GMM regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP2 for several samples of banks. Estimates are obtained using the
Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include time dummies. Instruments begin with the third lag. P-values are calculated on the basis
of standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond, one-step results are
presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second order autocorrelation
in the residuals. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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In contrast, the Sargan test is significant and sheds doubt on the specification in the
case of the cooperative banks. Problems with the specification arise mainly in case
of the larger samples of all cooperative banks and all banks. Obviously the size of
the sample is an important factor leading to significant Sargan tests. The Sargan test
confirms the validity of the set of instruments for the cooperative banks if 70 percent
of all cooperative banks (the smaller ones) are dropped. As the Sargan tests for al-
ternative smaller samples are insignificant, we maintain the specification of the mo-
del.
On the whole, the GMM-results are rather similar to those obtained with the fixed
effects model, although there are some remarkable differences. As a point in com-
mon the lagged capital ratio has a positive and significant impact on the capital ratio,
confirming the existence of dynamics in the model. The regression results for CAP1
and CAP2 indicate that there is a much faster adjustment of the capital ratio for other
banks compared to savings banks. For CAP1, it is 0.87 in the case of other banks (1-
0.1333) and 0.34 in the case of savings banks (1-0.6596). This result is due to the
greater volatility of CAP in the case of other banks compared to savings banks. Here
again, we can argue that other banks can adjust capital to their target capital more
quickly as they can issue new shares on the financial market or can sell investments
to reduce liabilities.
The results for the variable RISK indicate a positive relationship between portfolio
risk and the capital ratio for savings banks, confirming our hypothesis H1B. No evi-
dence for hypothesis H1A was found. That is why the deposit insurance has a minor
importance not only for savings banks but even for other banks. The result additio-
nally emphasises the importance of controlling for other (endogenous) explanatory
variables, as the correlation between portfolio risk and the capital ratio is negative
(see Table 1d). Contrary to the previous empirical literature we do not find a signifi-
cant relationship between the capital ratio and portfolio risk for all banks. Neverthe-
less, the result is not implausible. As other banks have generally more excess capital
than savings banks (see Table 1c), they are less likely to be subject to the regulatory
constraint and may raise portfolio risk while decreasing the capital ratio.
As contrasted to the preliminary evidence, profitability has a positive and significant
effect on capital only for savings banks, giving some evidence in support of the hy-
pothesis H2. As expected, profitability is of greatest importance for the savings
banks. These banks may be more dependent on internal profits than other banks to
increase capital, as they have less alternatives to raise capital than other banks. The
magnitude of the coefficient indicates that current PROFIT is an important determi-
nant of capital for savings banks.
The results for the banks’ deposit ratio (BDR) as a potential signal of future profits
are mixed. We find no negative relationship between BDR and the capital ratio for
savings banks but for other banks. For the latter banks a further explanation may
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hold: This banking group comprises German universal banks with a low capital ratio
and a high deposit ratio as well as special banks with a high capital ratio and a small
deposit ratio. Thus the negative coefficient for other banks may be just due to hete-
rogeneity. Our expectation that banks make a greater (smaller) effort to raise capital
when their deposit ratio decreases (increases) thus cannot be confirmed with cer-
tainty.
The results regarding the relationship between the ratio of provisions to total assets
(PROV) and the capital ratio are mixed. There is some evidence of an overall negati-
ve relationship between PROV and the capital ratio for savings banks. That could
mean that these banks cannot increase capital to a large extent if the amount of pro-
visions in the previous year indicates bad financial health. Here again, the limited
possibilities of the savings banks to increase capital may have led to that result. For
other banks, we obtain a positive effect of provisions on the capital ratio. Possibly
other banks issue new shares in bad financial health or sell investments to reduce
liabilities. Dahl and Shrieves (1990) show for instance that undercapitalised banks
were more likely to issue equity capital than adequately capitalised banks. That fin-
ding could be valid for banks with a large amount of provisions as well. Indeed, we
can confirm the finding that other banks with CAP1<6 percent increase subscribed
capital stronger than other banks, but we cannot find any significant impact of
PROV on the ratio of subscribed capital to total assets. Issuing new shares in bad
financial health thus does not appear to be important. Alternatively, highly profitable
banks may retain their earnings to increase the capital ratio substantially in bad
financial health. Indeed, interacting PROV with an additional dummy variable being
unity for highly profitable banks shows that the positive relationship between PROV
and the capital ratio for other banks is mainly due to highly profitable banks. That is
why the other banks’ rise of the capital ratio in bad financial health is mainly due to
retained earnings.
The dummy variable REG for regulatory pressure gives some evidence that the be-
haviour of banks whose capital is close to the regulatory minimum behave in a diffe-
rent way than better capitalised banks. Unlike the preliminary evidence, we obtain
significant and positive coefficients for savings banks and other banks in case of
CAP2, but significant and positive coefficients only for other banks in case of
CAP1. This fact suggests that savings banks under regulatory pressure try to leave
the zone of regulatory pressure by issuing subordinate debt or hybrid capital.
The dummy variable MERG remains positive and significant for other banks, but
becomes insignificant for savings banks. Possibly mergers among other banks are
motivated by increasing the capital ratio.
The results for SIZE are in line with the preliminary evidence. They implicate an
overall negative relationship between SIZE and the capital ratio, confirming our hy-
pothesis H3. Accordingly the larger the bank, the lower is the bank capital target.
25
This negative relationship holds for other banks but does not for the savings banks.
For these banks, some arguments in favour of a negative relationship between SIZE
and the capital ratio do not hold. As described under hypothesis H3, the different
institutional conditions of the savings banks may lead to the insignificant size effect
for savings banks.
6.2.1 Long-term effects
So far we have considered only the results from short-term dynamics and have ne-
glected the static long-term results according to equation (6). These are reported in
Tables 3c and 3d on the basis of the estimation results presented in Tables 3a and
3b. The results are very similar to those obtained from the short-term dynamic capi-
tal structure model.
Table 3c: Static long-term effects on CAP1 using GMM-DIF
RISKt 0.0533 0.0371 *** 0.0748 ** 0.1125
(0.0381) (0.0089) (0.0296) (0.0874)
PROFITt 0.2764 0.4785 *** -0.1337 0.2251
(0.2156) (0.1510) (1.2644) (0.1859)
BDRt 0.0211 -0.0029 -0.3854 *** -0.1189
(0.0620) (0.0108) (0.1032) (0.0760)
PROVt 1.4770 ** -0.2052 * -0.0258 1.5042 ***
(0.6612) (0.1196) (0.1372) (0.5718)
REG1ct-1 0.0013 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0070 **
(0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0032)
MERGt 0.0456 *** -0.0011 0.0440 *** 0.0286 *
(0.0079) (0.0031) (0.0165) (0.0163)
SIZEt -0.1187 *** 0.0012 -0.1137 ** -0.1286 ***
(0.0213) (0.0059) (0.0463) (0.0205)
Observations 22,083 4,534 15,396 2,153
Banks 2,971 590 2,089 292
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Results for CAP1 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks coop. banks other banks
Note: This Table refers to Table 3a and shows the long-run effects of the explanatory variables on CAP1. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 3d: Static long-term effects on CAP2 using GMM-DIF
RISKt 0.0654 * 0.0810 *** 0.0928 *** 0.0761
(0.0397) (0.0212) (0.0283) (0.0816)
PROFITt 0.4041 * 1.4509 *** -0.2552 0.1493
(0.2208) (0.3098) (1.2275) (0.1863)
BDRt 0.0397 -0.0029 -0.4053 *** -0.0827
(0.0603) (0.0255) (0.1128) (0.0714)
PROVt 1.3483 ** -0.2228 0.2429 1.5173 ***
(0.6401) (0.2363) (0.2181) (0.5611)
REG2ct-1 0.0013 0.0028 *** 0.0015 * 0.0151 *
(0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0084)
MERGt 0.0457 *** 0.0024 0.0395 ** 0.0347 *
(0.0083) (0.0065) (0.0170) (0.0185)
SIZEt -0.1188 *** 0.0063 -0.1067 ** -0.1263 ***
(0.0219) (0.0129) (0.0465) (0.0201)
Observations 22,083 4,534 15,396 2,153
Banks 2,971 590 2,089 292
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Results for CAP2 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks coop. banks other banks
Note: This Table refers to Table 3b and shows the long-run effects of the explanatory variables on CAP2. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
As in the short-term model, portfolio risk has a positive and significant long-term
impact on the capital ratio for savings banks, as these banks usually have a small
buffer of regulatory capital and are forced to increase capital with portfolio risk. Pro-
fitability has a positive and significant effect on capital only for savings banks. This
result is plausible, since savings banks are particularly dependent on profits to raise
capital.
The bank deposit ratio to total assets has no significant long-term effect on the capi-
tal ratio both for savings banks and other banks. Provisions have a negative long-
term impact on the capital ratio for savings banks, as these banks have limited pos-
sibilities to increase capital in bad financial health. In contrast, provisions have a
significant and positive effect on the capital ratio for other banks. As in the short-
term model, the dummy variable REG signalling regulatory pressure is significant
and positive for all banking groups in case of CAP2, but only for the other banks in
case of CAP1. The merger variable MERG is significant and positive for the other
banks but insignificant for the savings banks in the long term. The size of the bank
has a significant and negative long-run impact on capital for other banks, but no
long-run effect for savings banks.
6.2.2 Robustness check
First of all, we exclude those banks from the data set, which exhibit a very high re-
gulatory capital ratio and thus may behave in another way than the “typical” German
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universal bank. We assume that a ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
(CRWA3) greater than 20 percent may indicate an appropriate threshold to define
banks as outliers. We also tested for other thresholds, but found very similar results.
Tables 4a to b (Tables 4c to d) present the short-term (long-term) results for the data
set without these outliers. As a result, mainly other banks are dropped. The coeffi-
cients of the lagged dependent variable, t 1CAP  , become alike for the different ban-
king groups. But even here, the speed of adjustment for savings banks is lower than
for other banks. In contrast to Tables 3a to b, current RISK becomes significant and
positive for other banks, indicating that banks with CRWA3 ≤ 0.2 are exposed to ca-
pital regulation more strongly. Furthermore, the result suggests that other banks do
not have an own incentive to increase capital with portfolio risk. Additionally, we
obtain some evidence for a positive relationship between the bank deposit ratio and
the capital ratio in case of this less heterogeneous subsample of other banks. The
result suggests that these banks increase (decrease) their effort to raise the capital
ratio, if a rise (decline) in the bank deposit ratio is suggesting higher (lower) future
profits.
The merger variable turns insignificant for other banks when those banks with a
high regulatory capital ratio are ignored. It suggests that banks with a lower capital
ratio do not increase their capital ratio by mergers. The size effect remains negative
and significant for other banks, but insignificant for savings banks.
Table 4a: Dynamic GMM-DIF-regression for CAP1 without “outliers”
P-value P-value P-value P-value
CAP1t-1 0.5969 *** 0.000 0.6596 *** 0.000 0.5946 *** 0.000 0.4239 *** 0.000
RISKt 0.0589 *** 0.000 0.0180 *** 0.000 0.0292 *** 0.000 0.0606 *** 0.003
RISKt-1 -0.0387 *** 0.000 -0.0054 0.222 -0.0180 *** 0.000 -0.0322 ** 0.020
PROFITt 0.1070 0.160 0.1147 ** 0.017 0.2867 *** 0.000 0.0273 0.803
PROFITt-1 -0.0360 0.515 0.0482 0.136 -0.1211 *** 0.002 -0.1521 * 0.098
BDRt 0.0248 * 0.060 0.0302 *** 0.000 0.0091 0.263 0.0262 * 0.089
BDRt-1 -0.0283 ** 0.017 -0.0312 *** 0.000 -0.0097 0.147 -0.0088 0.475
PROVt 0.2016 *** 0.001 -0.0192 0.572 0.0169 0.804 0.2463 * 0.065
PROVt-1 -0.0595 *** 0.002 -0.0507 *** 0.001 -0.0469 ** 0.012 -0.0604 0.155
REG1ct-1 -0.0001 0.152 0.0001 0.173 -0.0001 0.449 0.0020 *** 0.002
MERGt 0.0019 0.008 -0.0004 0.719 -0.0014 * 0.054 0.0023 0.378
SIZEt -0.0051 *** 0.002 0.0004 0.833 0.0046 ** 0.025 -0.0114 *** 0.005
cons 0.0003 0.270 0.0005 ** 0.020 0.0004 0.156 0.0009 0.259
Observations 21,261 4,534 15,344 1,383
Banks 2,859 590 2,083 186
Sargan (df) 430(241) 0.00 256(241) 0.25 423(241) 0.00 176(241) 1.00
AR(1) -8.49 0.00 -7.32 0.00 -9.15 0.00 -3.69 0.00
AR(2) -0.43 0.67 -1.10 0.27 -0.96 0.34 -0.19 0.85
other banks
Results for CAP1 (to total assets)
savings banksall banks cooperative banks
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Note: These are GMM regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP1 for several samples of banks. Estimates are obtained using the
Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include time dummies. Instruments begin with the third lag. P-values are calculated on the basis
of standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond, one-step results are
presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second order autocorrelation
in the residuals. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4b: Dynamic GMM-DIF-regression for CAP2 without “outliers”
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value
CAP3t-1 0.3677 *** 0.000 0.6231 *** 0.000 0.4341 *** 0.000 0.4390 0.000
RISKt 0.0658 *** 0.000 0.0485 *** 0.000 0.0279 *** 0.000 0.0679 0.001
RISKt-1 -0.0175 ** 0.033 -0.0180 0.124 -0.0122 *** 0.005 -0.0322 0.056
PROFITt 0.2228 ** 0.025 0.5850 *** 0.000 0.3873 *** 0.005 0.0807 0.526
PROFITt-1 -0.1052 0.127 -0.0382 0.639 -0.1782 ** 0.024 -0.1467 0.208
BDRt 0.0195 0.104 0.0110 0.392 -0.0062 0.566 0.0158 0.324
BDRt-1 -0.0306 ** 0.018 -0.0121 0.315 0.0040 0.727 -0.0006 0.966
PROVt 0.1340 0.100 -0.0901 0.273 0.0802 0.345 0.2434 0.092
PROVt-1 -0.0594 ** 0.020 0.0062 0.868 -0.0616 ** 0.015 -0.1221 0.007
REG2ct-1 0.0013 *** 0.000 0.0011 *** 0.000 0.0005 ** 0.016 0.0032 0.008
MERGt 0.0024 *** 0.002 0.0009 0.709 -0.0034 *** 0.002 0.0023 0.382
SIZEt -0.0069 *** 0.001 0.0024 0.623 0.0087 *** 0.005 -0.0104 0.006
cons 0.0001 0.710 -0.0038 *** 0.000 0.0000 0.912 -0.0002 0.869
Observations 21,261 4,534 15,344 1,383
Banks 2,859 590 2,083 186
Sargan (df) 465(241) 0.00 345(241) 0.00 410(421) 0.00 168(241) 1.00
AR(1) -6.93 0.00 -7.84 0.00 -9.03 0.00 -4.12 0.00
AR(2) -0.51 0.61 -1.00 0.32 -0.13 0.90 -0.30 0.76
Results for CAP2 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks cooperative banks other banks
Note: These are GMM regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP2 for several samples of banks. Estimates are obtained using the
Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include time dummies. Instruments begin with the third lag. P-values are calculated on the basis
of standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond, one-step results are
presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second order autocorrelation
in the residuals. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 4c: Static long-term effects on CAP1 using GMM-DIF (without “outliers”)
RISKt 0.0502 *** 0.0371 *** 0.0275 *** 0.0493 *
(0.0106) (0.0089) (0.0065) (0.0278)
PROFITt 0.1763 0.4785 *** 0.4124 *** -0.2166
(0.1307) (0.1510) (0.0981) (0.2158)
BDRt -0.0087 -0.0029 -0.0150 0.0301 *
(0.0171) (0.0108) (0.0165) (0.0180)
PROVt 0.3526 *** -0.2052 * -0.0523 0.3228
(0.1367) (0.1196) (0.1480) (0.2849)
REG1ct-1 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0035 ***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0011)
MERGt 0.0046 *** -0.0011 -0.0035 * 0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0043)
SIZEt -0.0128 *** 0.0012 0.0051 -0.0198 ***
(0.0037) (0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0062)
Observations 21,261 4,534 15,344 1,383
Banks 2,859 590 2,083 186
Results for CAP1 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks coop. banks other banks
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Note: This Table refers to Table 4a and shows the long-run effects of the explanatory variables on CAP1. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 4d: Static long-term effects on CAP2 using GMM-DIF (without “outliers”)
RISKt 0.0763 *** 0.0810 *** 0.0277 ** 0.0638 **
(0.0113) (0.0212) (0.0110) (0.0325)
PROFITt 0.1860 1.4509 *** 0.3695 *** -0.1177
(0.1149) (0.3098) (0.1303) (0.2393)
BDRt -0.0176 -0.0029 -0.0040 0.0272
(0.0139) (0.0255) (0.0147) (0.0224)
PROVt 0.1180 -0.2228 0.0329 0.2161
(0.1145) (0.2363) (0.1271) (0.2866)
REG2ct-1 0.0020 *** 0.0028 *** 0.0009 ** 0.0057 **
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0023)
MERGt 0.0039 *** 0.0024 -0.0059 *** 0.0041
(0.0013) (0.0065) (0.0020) (0.0046)
SIZEt -0.0109 *** 0.0063 0.0154 *** -0.0185 ***
(0.0033) (0.0129) (0.0056) (0.0062)
Observations 21,261 4,534 15,344 1,383
Banks 2,859 590 2,083 186
Results for CAP2 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks coop. banks other banks
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Note: This Table refers to Table 4b and shows the long-run effects of the explanatory variables on CAP2. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
6.2.3 Hoppenstedt data set
As the Sargan test still sheds some doubt on the validity of the specification for the
cooperative banks, we re-examined the model with the help of the Hoppenstedt data
set. The results of the short-term model are given in Tables 5a to b, the results of the
long-term model in Tables 5c to d. Here, the Sargan test always confirms the vali-
dity of the set of instruments even for the cooperative banks. In addition, the results
are similar to those drawn from the Bundesbank data set (Tables 4a to d). Thus our
results from the Bundesbank data set are largely confirmed by the results on the ba-
sis of the Hoppenstedt data set. In the following we may interpret the coefficients for
the cooperative banks. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable nearly re-
main the same for cooperative banks compared to Tables 3 a to b. Although we do
not find a positive and significant effect of current portfolio risk and current profita-
bility on the capital ratio in the short-term model, we obtain it in the long-term-
model. The dummy variable REG indicating regulatory pressure is insignificant for
CAP1 but significant and positive for CAP2. Possibly cooperative banks being badly
capitalised issue subordinate and hybrid capital to increase their capital ratio. The
size effect is significant and negative. This finding corresponds to our hypothesis
H3.
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Table 5a: Dynamic GMM-DIF-regression for CAP1 (Hoppenstedt data set)
P-value P-value P-value P-value
CAP1t-1 0.2440 *** 0.009 0.7077 *** 0.000 0.6897 *** 0.000 0.1573 * 0.078
RISKt -0.1157 0.242 0.0088 *** 0.000 0.0191 0.293 -0.1352 0.241
RISKt-1 0.0669 0.168 0.0001 0.950 0.0023 0.847 0.1711 *** 0.004
PROFITt 1.4263 ** 0.015 0.2944 *** 0.000 -2.0469 ** 0.016 0.8733 * 0.056
PROFITt-1 -0.0528 * 0.090 -0.0090 0.838 2.6502 *** 0.001 -0.0550 ** 0.044
BDRt -0.0912 0.295 0.0205 *** 0.001 -0.1247 ** 0.046 -0.0783 0.378
BDRt-1 0.1374 *** 0.004 -0.0409 *** 0.000 0.0224 0.583 0.1172 ** 0.024
PROVt -0.6319 0.111 -0.0993 *** 0.001 0.2137 0.355 -0.8049 0.105
PROVt-1 0.1272 0.394 -0.0184 0.221 -0.3381 ** 0.015 -0.0245 0.872
REG1ct-1 0.0016 * 0.085 0.0001 0.104 0.0001 0.697 0.0068 *** 0.008
MERGt 0.0418 *** 0.003 -0.0019 * 0.085 0.0110 *** 0.004 0.0787 ** 0.017
SIZEt -0.0980 *** 0.000 -0.0007 0.601 -0.0304 *** 0.003 -0.1095 *** 0.000
cons 0.0065 ** 0.030 0.0003 0.288 0.0025 ** 0.011 0.0010 0.851
Observations 6,927 3,298 2,079 1,550
Banks 920 438 274 208
Sargan (df) 291(241) 0.02 243(241) 0.45 230241) 0.69 191(241) 0.99
AR(1) -2.60 0.01 -5.79 0.00 -2.33 0.02 -2.08 0.04
AR(2) 0.09 0.93 1.39 0.16 0.94 0.35 -0.17 0.87
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Results for CAP1 (to total assets)
savings banksall banks cooperative banks other banks
Note: These are GMM regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP1 for several samples of banks. Estimates are obtained using the
Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include time dummies. Instruments begin with the third lag. P-values are calculated on the basis
of standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond, one-step results are
presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second order autocorrelation
in the residuals. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 5b: Dynamic GMM-DIF-regression for CAP2 (Hoppenstedt data set)
P-value P-value P-value P-value
CAP2t-1 0.2357 ** 0.014 0.5723 *** 0.000 0.6771 *** 0.000 0.1612 * 0.079
RISKt -0.0923 0.333 0.0226 *** 0.000 0.0167 0.311 -0.1279 0.274
RISKt-1 0.0653 0.161 0.0029 0.253 0.0048 0.679 0.1642 *** 0.008
PROFITt 1.5130 *** 0.003 0.8294 *** 0.000 -1.9574 ** 0.027 0.9676 ** 0.011
PROFITt-1 -0.0520 0.106 -0.2332 ** 0.026 2.4162 *** 0.002 -0.0628 ** 0.021
BDRt -0.0662 0.458 -0.0100 0.527 -0.1617 ** 0.012 -0.0561 0.526
BDRt-1 0.1384 *** 0.004 -0.0081 0.576 0.0509 0.254 0.0944 * 0.056
PROVt -0.4673 0.257 0.0950 0.316 0.0523 0.812 -0.3745 0.481
PROVt-1 0.1366 0.330 0.0261 0.491 -0.2845 * 0.085 0.0171 0.902
REG2ct-1 0.0031 ** 0.010 0.0015 *** 0.000 0.0010 ** 0.042 0.0068 ** 0.015
MERGt 0.0420 *** 0.002 -0.0029 0.267 0.0141 *** 0.002 0.0801 ** 0.014
SIZEt -0.0972 *** 0.000 0.0004 0.918 -0.0355 *** 0.002 -0.1101 *** 0.000
cons 0.0063 * 0.050 -0.0042 *** 0.000 0.0016 0.188 0.0028 0.609
Observations 6,927 3,298 2,079 1,550
Banks 920 438 274 208
Sargan (df) 321(241) 0.00 271(241) 0.09 234(241) 0.62 214(241) 0.99
AR(1) -2.45 0.01 -6.66 0.00 -2.61 0.01 -2.08 0.04
AR(2) 0.00 1.00 -1.89 0.06 0.63 0.53 -0.19 0.85
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Results for CAP2 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks cooperative banks other banks
Note: These are GMM regression results relating explanatory variables to CAP2 for several samples of banks. Estimates are obtained using the
Arellano and Bond (1991) method. All regressions include time dummies. Instruments begin with the third lag. P-values are calculated on the basis
of standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond, one-step results are
presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second order autocorrelation
in the residuals. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Table 5c: Static long-term effects on CAP1 using GMM-DIF (Hoppenstedt data set)
RISKt -0.0645 0.0304 *** 0.0691 * 0.0426
(0.0765) (0.0086) (0.0383) (0.1071)
PROFITt 1.8168 ** 0.9764 *** 1.9442 ** 0.9711 *
(0.7418) (0.2293) (0.8240) (0.5238)
BDRt 0.0611 -0.0696 *** -0.3297 *** 0.0462
(0.1016) (0.0207) (0.0673) (0.0840)
PROVt -0.6676 -0.4025 *** -0.4007 -0.9843
(0.5507) (0.1519) (0.6967) (0.6207)
REG1ct-1 0.0021 * 0.0004 0.0004 0.0080 ***
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0030)
MERGt 0.0031 -0.0066 * -0.0013 0.0103
(0.0175) (0.0038) (0.0089) (0.0366)
SIZEt -0.1297 *** -0.0025 -0.0979 *** -0.1300 ***
(0.0327) (0.0047) (0.0219) (0.0262)
Observations 6,927 3,298 2,079 1,550
Banks 920 438 274 208
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Results for CAP1 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks coop. banks other banks
Note: This Table refers to Table 5a and shows the long-run effects of the explanatory variables on CAP1. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 5d: Static long-term effects on CAP2 using GMM-DIF (Hoppenstedt data set)
RISKt -0.0354 0.0596 *** 0.0664 * 0.0433
(0.0771) (0.0155) (0.0401) (0.1114)
PROFITt 1.9116 *** 1.3941 *** 1.4207 * 1.0787 **
(0.6609) (0.4415) (0.8630) (0.4396)
BDRt 0.0945 -0.0423 -0.3433 *** 0.0457
(0.1083) (0.0295) (0.0724) (0.0852)
PROVt -0.4327 0.1240 -0.7192 -0.4260
(0.5674) (0.2454) (0.6790) (0.6568)
REG2ct-1 0.0041 ** 0.0034 *** 0.0031 ** 0.0081 **
(0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0035)
MERGt 0.0045 -0.0052 0.0041 0.0151
(0.0170) (0.0061) (0.0104) (0.0368)
SIZEt -0.1272 *** 0.0010 -0.1101 *** -0.1312 ***
(0.0335) (0.0100) (0.0251) (0.0286)
Observations 6,927 3,298 2,079 1,550
Banks 920 438 274 208
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Results for CAP2 (to total assets)
all banks savings banks coop. banks other banks
Note: This Table refers to Table 5b and shows the long-run effects of the explanatory variables on CAP2. Asymptotic standard errors are in paren-
theses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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7 Subordinate debt issue
Until now we have examined the determinants of the bank capital ratio and have
found little evidence that the determinants differ depending on which definition of
bank capital we use. Now, we turn to the structure of bank capital in detail, and
analyse whether there are differences between the various banking groups. As
shown in Table 1c, savings banks have issued subordinate debt in the reference pe-
riod from 1992 to 2001 to a larger extent than other banks. Furthermore, Table 6a
suggests that banks issuing subordinated debt have a lower capital ratio than non-
issuing savings banks. Accordingly, we presume that a lack of equity capital could
have led mainly savings banks to increase their Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital ratio by is-
suing subordinate debt, as for savings banks issuing subordinate debt is one of the
few possibilities to increase regulatory capital besides retaining earnings.
To analyse our presumption, we regress the ratio of subordinate debt to proxy Tier 1
capital (sub) on the lagged ratio of proxy Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
(CRWA3_1).16 We chose the lagged capital ratio because of potential endogeneity
problems. Two interaction terms are added: firstly the lagged CRWA3 interacted
with a dummy being unity for all savings banks (SB), and secondly, the lagged
CRWA3 interacted with a dummy being unity for all cooperative banks (CB). Table
6b shows the results. As expected, the coefficient for all banks is significant and ne-
gative, signalling that all banks use subordinate debt to supplement their equity ca-
pital. This finding is consistent with Ito and Sasaki (1998), Horiuchi and Shimizu
(1998) and Iwatsubo (2002) for Japanese banks. The coefficients of the interaction
terms for the cooperative and savings banks are significant and negative, especially
for the savings banks, suggesting that particularly savings banks were forced to in-
crease capital by issuing subordinate debt. In this regard, the subordinated debt ratio
may indicate the level of regulatory pressure.
Table 6a: Means of CRWA3 for different banking groups
CRWA3
Obs. mean Obs. mean
all banks 16,011 0.1472 12,014 0.0671
sav. banks 1,495 0.0711 4,219 0.0616
coop. banks 12,858 0.0786 6,716 0.0653
other banks 1,658 0.7482 1,079 0.0992
sub=0 sub>0
Note: Presented are means of proxy Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (CRWA3) for banks with and without a positive ratio of subordinate debt
to proxy Tier 1 capital (sub).
                                          
16 A fixed effects logit model is estimated as well and shows similar results. An alternative random
effects tobit model to take account of  the information ‘sub=0’ is inappropriate here, as the
Hausman test rejects the random effects assumption.
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Table 6b: Subordinate debt issue by different banking groups
sub Coef. P-value
CRWA3_1 -0.1557 0.005
SB*CRWA3_1 -5.2214 0.000
CB*CRWA3_1 -2.8291 0.000
cons 0.5518 0.000
Obs. 12,013
Banks: 1,617
R2 within 0.12
R2 between 0.04
R2 overall 0.01
Note: These are fixed effects regression results of subordinate debt to proxy Tier 1 capital (sub) on lagged proxy Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted
assets (CRWA3_1). It is differentiated between savings banks (SB) and cooperative banks  (CB) by interaction with CRWA3_1. Time dummies are
included. Only banks with sub>0 are taken into account.
8 Conclusions
This study examines the relevance of potential determinants for the capital ratio of
German banks. A unique data set provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank comprising
yearly balance sheet and profit and loss account information from 1992 to 2001 for
nearly all German banks is employed. Subsamples for savings banks, cooperative
banks and other banks are examined to consider the characteristics of these three
pillars of the German banking sector. We take account of the panel structure of the
data set and apply generalised method of moments (GMM) to estimate the banks’
dynamic adjustments of capital.
We find that portfolio risk has a positive and significant effect on the capital ratio for
savings banks as regulation is more likely to be binding for these weaker capitalised
banks. In the long run, this relationship holds even for cooperative banks. Profitabi-
lity has a positive and significant short-term and long-term impact on the capital ra-
tio for the savings banks. These banks particularly depend on retained earnings, as
they have less alternatives to increase their capital ratio than other banks.
The results for the bank deposit ratio as a potential determinant of the bank capital
ratio are less clear. There is only weak evidence of a positive long-run impact in
case of less capitalised other banks, suggesting that these banks increase (decrease)
their effort to raise the capital ratio, if a rise (decline) in the bank deposit ratio is
suggesting higher (lower) future profits.
In addition, results suggest that loan loss provisions as a signal of bad financial
health influence the capital ratio decision. We find a negative effect of the ratio of
provisions to total assets on the capital ratio for the savings banks. In contrast, we
obtain a positive effect for the group of other banks. Further analysis suggests that
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this effect is mainly due to highly profitable other banks retaining their earnings in
bad financial health.
Regulatory pressure has a significant and positive effect on the capital ratio. Accor-
dingly, banks with a capital ratio close to the regulatory minimum increase their ca-
pital ratio to a greater extent than other banks. Furthermore, we find some evidence
that mergers among other banks have a positive impact on the capital ratio. Finally,
size has a significant and negative impact on bank capital for other banks. For sa-
vings banks the effect is insignificant. The size effect is smaller for savings banks, as
some arguments in favour of a negative size effect only hold for other banks.
We also examine the issue of subordinated debt by the three different banking
groups. Results suggest that particularly savings banks use subordinated debt as an
instrument to improve their relatively low capitalisation. This effect may be due to
the limited alternatives of the savings banks to increase capital.
This study is to improve the understanding of how German banks determine their
capital ratio. Further analysis might examine the relationship between the banks’
capital ratio and the actual portfolio risk more closely. According to the current
Basle Capital Accord, portfolio risk is defined imprecisely with the help of some
broad risk classes. As the New Basel Capital Accord defines portfolio risk more pre-
cisely, it might be shown that the actual portfolio risk and the capital ratio become
closer related.
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Appendix
Definitions of variables (Bundesbank data set; notation of positions refer to Deutsche Bun-
desbank, 2003)
CAP1: Equity capital (position 310) / total assets (position 330)
CAP2: Proxy variable for Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital [Equity capital (position 310) – outstanding capi-
tal contributions (position 150) – own shares (position 160) + fund for general bank risks (position
300)} + profit-sharing capital (position 290)} + subordinate debt (position 280)] / total assets (po-
sition 330)
CAP3: Proxy variable for Tier 1 capital [Equity capital (position 310) – outstanding capital contri-
butions (position 150) – own shares (position 160) + fund for general bank risk (position 300)] /
total assets (position 330)
CRWA1: Equity capital (position 310) to risk-weighted balance sheet assets
CRWA2: Proxy variable for Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital [Equity capital (position 310) – outstanding
capital contributions (position 150) – own shares (position 160) + fund for general bank risks (po-
sition 300)} + profit-sharing capital (position 290) + subordinate debt (position 280)] / risk-
weighted balance sheet assets
CRWA3: Proxy variable for Tier 1 capital [Equity capital (position 310) – outstanding capital
contributions (position 150) – own shares (position 160) + fund for general bank risks (position
300)] / risk-weighted balance sheet assets
RISK: Risk-weighted balance sheet assets according to the Basle Accord / total assets (position
330)
PROFIT: [Net interest income + net commission income] / total assets (position 330)
BDR: Liabilities to customers (position220) / total assets (position 330)
PROV: Provisions for possible loan losses, write-downs and write-ups of and value adjustments to
claims and securities / total assets (position 330)
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SIZE: Natural Logarithm of total assets (position 330)
SDEBT: Subordinate debt (position 280) / total assets (position 330)
PCAP: Profit-sharing capital (position 290)} / total assets (position 330)
Definitions of variables (Hoppenstedt data set; notation of positions according to Hoppen-
stedt in parentheses)
CAP1: Equity capital [gezei+einin+gegut+haftk+komei+akson+offen+sonek+bilge+auspo] / total
assets (bisup)
CAP2: Proxy variable for Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital [gezei+einin+ggvmi+haftk+komei+akson+offen
+sonek+bilge +auspo+foalr-nwvza-eigak-imanl-ausei+navbk+genka]  / total assets (bisup)
CAP3: Proxy variable for Tier 1 capital [gezei+einin+ggvmi+haftk+komei+akson+offen
+sonek+bilge+auspo+foalr-nwvza-eigak-imanl-ausei] / total assets (bisup)
CRWA1: Equity capital [gezei+einin+gegut+haftk+komei+akson+offen+sonek+bilge+auspo] /
risk-weighted balance sheet assets
CRWA2: Proxy variable for Tier 1 + Tier 2 capital [gezei+einin+ggvmi+haftk+komei+akson
+offen+sonek+bilge+auspo+foalr-nwvza-eigak-imanl-ausei+navbk+genka] / risk-weighted bal-
ance sheet assets
CRWA3: Proxy variable for Tier 1 capital [gezei+einin+ggvmi+haftk+komei+akson+offen
+sonek+bilge+auspo+foalr-nwvza-eigak-imanl-ausei] / risk-weighted balance sheet assets
RISK: Risk-weighted balance sheet assets according to the Basle Accord / total assets (bisup)
PROFIT: Net interest income plus net commission income (erglg) / total assets (bisup)
BDR: Liabilities to customers (kunve) / total assets (bisup)
PROV: Provisions for possible loan losses, write-downs and write-ups of and value adjustments to
claims and securities (yaeaf+yseab-yaeae-ysezu) / total assets (bisup)
SIZE: Natural Logarithm of total assets (bisup)
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SDEBT: Subordinated debt (navbk) / total assets (bisup)
PCAP: Profit-sharing capital (genka) / total assets (bisup)
Explanatory note:
gezei Subscribed capital
einin Capital contribution of all members of the company with full liability
gegut Capital contribution of all members of cooperative banks
ggvmi Capital contribution of remaining members of cooperative banks
haftk Capital contribution of the public owner of savings banks
komei Capital contribution of limited partners and sleeping partners
akson Non-specific capital components
offen Open reserves
sonek Non-specific capital components
bilge Distributable profit
auspo Adjustment items
foalr Fund for general bank risks (general provisions)
nwvza Nominal value of preference shares 
ausei Outstanding capital contributions 
eigak Nominal value of own shares
imanl Intangible assets
genka Profit-sharing capital
navbk Subordinate debt
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